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MOROCCO—A DIPLOMATIC COMPLEX

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MOROCCO — A DIPLOMATIC COMPLEX

By Lieutenant Commander Lucius C. Dunn, U. S. Navy

CONTRARY to prevailing popular belief the World War did not have its beginning at Sarajevo. It is true that the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife in that quaint little Bosnian city in June, 1914, was the fulminating cap which detonated the European powder magazines. It is likewise true that for years certain European nations had been preparing for the war which was to sweep across that continent like a loathful scourge, but the actual *casus belli* was far more deep-seated than the now famous Austro-Hungarian ultimatum delivered to Serbia. To discover the true genesis of the war we must dig deeper than that. We must even look across the Mediterranean to another continent—the dark continent, for there it was that the first war clouds gathered.

It is, moreover, a curious run of circumstances that the African continent has either directly or indirectly served as the rooting-ground for germinating many other wars and national crises of recorded history, among which witness the various conquests in Egypt, the Punic Wars, the Boer War, the Italian expeditions in Tripoli, the French colonial skirmishes in North Africa, and not the least among these our own Civil War—for did not the people for whose emancipation that war was fought originally come from Africa? Even the recent Spanish crisis which culminated in establishing a dictator over that country came about in part over the question of policy to be adopted in suppressing the Moorish uprisings in an around the Melilla district of Spanish Morocco.

But to return to the World War. As we shall later see, the first dark clouds of that war gathered on the horizon of that degenerated and extremely backward country of Morocco, and it is that rainbow-hued country which forms the subject of this article.

For centuries European diplomatic eyes have been focused upon

that sadly neglected land of the Sultan. Out of certain negotiations entered into between France and Great Britain over Moroccan affairs was born the Entente Cordiale. Even the United States with her traditional policy of "no entangling alliances" has, with certain definite reservations, entered into one international convention and one international conference dealing specifically with Moroccan affairs. But more about that later.

A brief panoramic view of the checkered and hectic history of Morocco will first be given in order to develop a proper background for the study of that country and its relation to certain events leading up to the World War. The earliest traces of Moroccan history indicate that the country was first inhabited by aboriginal Berber tribes; then came the Phoenicians who were the first civilized peoples of record to set foot on Moroccan soil and to cross the trails of its indigenous Berbers. This occurred about a dozen centuries before the birth of Christ. Those sturdy old seadogs—the ancient mariners who first gave seaborne commerce to the world—sailed out into the classical Mediterranean, leaving their native cities of Tyre and Sidon far astern, and steered a general westerly course by keeping Polaris bearing on the starboard beams of the ships which they had hewn out of the cedars of Lebanon. This brought them upon the northern coast of Africa where, in keeping with their mercenary instincts, they established trading posts at Carthage and elsewhere.

Later, when Carthage had become a flourishing city, intensive commercial contact was established between the traders from that city and the Berber tribes who inhabited the north and west coasts of Morocco, and in time, these Carthaginian traders came to exert a considerable degree of influence upon the nomadic population. Owing to the fact that the rugged Riffian chain which extends diagonally along the northern coast was inhabited by savage tribes of Berbers, an effective barrier was thus rendered against infiltration of the interior country by the traders from the east, and in consequence their sphere of influence was confined largely to the coastal regions of Morocco. Further to the southward, however, copious penetration of the interior country was effected by them, since the country bordering upon the Atlantic seaboard in that locality is relatively low and permits of comparatively easy access to the adjacent hinterland.

As time went on Carthaginian colonies sprang up all along the

ATLANTIC
SPAIN
Cadiz
Strait of Gibraltar
Tangier
Gibraltar
Ceuta
MEDITERRANEAN
Larache
Tetuan
Wezzan
Melilla
Oudjda
ALGERIA
Salee
Rabat
FEZ
Taxa
Casablanca
Mequinez
Boujad
Mazaghan
Saffi
O. Yensit
Figig
Mogador
Agadir
MOROCCO
THE DESERT

northern and western coasts of Morocco, notably at Melilla, Tangier, Larache, Sale and Casablanca. Some of those ports served as bases for the splendidly equipped and well manned war galleys of the Carthaginian Navy, as they patrolled the western Mediterranean. Out of those ports also sailed that fine fleet when it went forth to give battle to the Roman Fleet in the First Punic War, which marked the beginning of the decline of Phoenician sea power.

Later, under those same African skies, was born Hannibal, with his dreams of conquest which were destined to lead him across the Mediterranean into Spain for his famous march across the Pyrenees, down through Gaul, and over the Alps into Italy to engage the Romans on their own soil. Accompanying Hannibal on this march were thousands of African natives, including the fearless Numidian cavalry now famous in history. An interesting sequel to that event is presented when we consider those other hundreds of thousands of native troops which were poured into France from her North African colonies in order to stem the tide of the German advance in those critical days of the World War. Moreover, the potential value of France's present reservoir of man-power in North Africa is markedly emphasized when one considers that in her last national emergency she was able to hurl into the balance against the Germans over 1,000,000 men chosen from her colonies on that continent, or about one half the total number of men sent across the Atlantic to France by the United States during that war.

Following Hannibal's exit from Europe came the end of the Second Punic War, and the consequent passing to the Romans of the supremacy of the western Mediterranean.

After the destruction of Carthage by the Romans, in 146 B. C.—the climax of the Third Punic War—the Romans set up a protectorate over the entire Carthaginian territory in Africa, the westernmost section of which was known as Mauretania and included what is now Morocco, representing the extreme western limits of the Roman Empire. Roman civilization spread rapidly throughout this region, and the city of Volubilis was established in the vicinity of what is now Fez, the present capital of Morocco. The Roman ruins of Volubilis rank in importance with several other such historical landmarks in North Africa and constitute one of the interesting sights to be seen by the constantly increasing number of tourists who annually visit that land.

Another interesting sequel of this country's history brought down to modern times is that just as in its heyday of Roman influence the fertile fields became the granaries of Rome, so today those same fields, swept by the warm winds from the Sahara, have becomes the granaries of the French Republic. At present the cereal crops in French North Africa yield annually about 4,000,000 tons of wheat, barley and oats, and with improved methods of cultivation and irrigation now being rapidly instituted the outlook is promising for a very material increase in the future.

In the fifth century Morocco became subjected to the rule of the Vandals, continuing thus until about 618, when the control passed to the Goths. In 682 came the Arabs, and in 702 an Islamic expedition coming from beyond the Nile and consisting of hordes of bernoused and turbaned Arabs and Egyptians poured into the country and gained entire control of the region bordering upon the Straits of Gibraltar. Indeed, this flood tide of Islamic invasion was of such magnitude as to spread across the straits and saturate to a considerable degree the Iberian peninsula—now modern Spain. With them came the crescent-emblazoned banner of the Prophet, the Koran, and the sword, and their crossing the straits and setting foot on European soil, at Tarifa, was epochal, as it marked the beginning of the struggle which was to result in the 800 years' ascendancy of the Crescent over the Cross on the plains of Andalusia. It was during this era also that Charles Martel immortalized himself in the eyes of the Christian world when at Tours, in 732, he checked this Islamic tide which was setting in across Europe from the southwest, and forced the Crescent back across the Pyrenees.

Recorded history of the Moorish Empire in Morocco commences with the settlement near the Roman ruins of Volubilis in 788 A. D. Then followed a succession of Islamic wars and consequent changes of dynasties until the zenith of Moorish influence and power was reached at the close of the twelfth century. At that time the Moorish Empire extended to the very western frontiers of Egypt and comprised what is now Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli.

Commencing about the middle of the fourteenth century the empire began to disintegrate from within through disputes brought about among rival dynastic claimants. Early in the fifteenth century the Portuguese effected a foothold on the Moroccan coast

when the port of Ceuta—the African Pillar of Hercules—which is directly opposite Gibraltar, was occupied, and a little more than fifty years later the interesting and colorful city of Tangier passed under the rule of the Portuguese flag; inasmuch as that city has played—and is still playing—a very important part in the modern history of Morocco, and especially with regard to her international relations, a few brief historical notes are of timely interest.

Although originally occupied by the Portuguese in 1471, Tangier passed under Spanish rule in 1580, and was again occupied by the Portuguese in 1656. In 1662 it passed into the possession of the British through being a part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, the infanta of Portugal, upon her marriage to Charles II. Owing, however, to the strenuous and constant insurrections and other desultory operations persisted in against the British at Tangier by the Moors of that region, the bride's wedding present to the groom turned out to be a vicious nest of hornets instead of a commercial cozy-corner in Morocco, so, for reasons of economy, the British, in 1664, packed up bag and baggage and evacuated the city, leaving it to the mercies of the closely following Moors. History records that this evacuation proved to be a thrilling affair and bore none of the friendly ear-marks of a Sunday School picnic. Since that time Tangier has remained in the possession of His Shereefian Majesty, the Sultan of Morocco. The Act of Algeciras, which practically internationalized Tangier, will be mentioned in some detail later.

Following the Portuguese capture of Tangier came the Spanish capture of the port of Melilla, which event occurred just two years before Columbus discovered America. Since that time, moreover, Spain has been practically constantly engaged in armed conflict with the Moors over this Riffian district. It is still going on, and, as before stated, was one of the prime causes which brought about the recent overthrow of the Spanish Government, and which prompted King Alfonso XIII to proclaim Primo de Rivera as dictator over that country. It is here of passing interest to note that the military dictator himself served with distinction in the Spanish campaign in Morocco in the early '90's, a very high decoration having been subsequently conferred upon him by his government for bravery in that campaign.

In the closing years of the fifteenth century, during the reign of

Ferdinand and Isabella, the Moors were driven out of their last stronghold in Spain, Granada, and were forced back across the Straits of Gibraltar into Morocco.

Early in the sixteenth century steps were taken by the Sultan of Morocco to establish friendly commercial relations with the countries of western Europe. Trade contact with Great Britain was accordingly arranged through Queen Elizabeth. Similar relations with France soon followed, whereupon that country appointed a consul to Morocco. Great Britain's consul to the land of the Moors was not appointed, however, until a century later.

In connection with the subject of Morocco's commercial aspirations it is of interest to observe that although bordering upon two of the most important waters on the globe—indeed, veritably fronting on the world's oldest and richest seaborne trade route through the Mediterranean—that country, since the advent of Moorish influence, has never possessed a navy. Of course, as has previously been pointed out, the ancient Phoenicians possessed a superb navy when they controlled this country and prior to the destruction of Carthage, but Morocco of the Moors has never boasted of sea power, and to that fact, it is believed, may be attributed in large measure the apathetic and atrophic standing to which that country has been relegated in the realms of international affairs. The nearest approach to a navy were the semi-organized bands of pirates who infested the Barbary Coast and who at times were fitted out and equipped for their piratical excursions against the civilized world by the states to whom they owed allegiance and to whom their loot and prizes were tendered. Their vessels comprised an assortment of almost every known type of craft and rig of the day and varied greatly from time to time in number and size. Tangier was one of the rendezvous from which they operated. The activities of these seafaring brigands began in the sixteenth century, attained their maximum degree of success a century later, gradually declined during the eighteenth century, and were completely suppressed early in the nineteenth century.

It was during the latter period, 1801-05 and 1815, that the United States Navy was actively engaged in operations against these Barbary pirates, and it was during this time also that some of the most brilliant and gallant pages in the history of our naval service were written, while our fleet was engaged in protecting our

merchant ships from those marauding desperadoes of the sea. The names of Decatur, Bainbridge, Preble and Truxtun will ever stand out as living memorials to the honor of our Navy—names made famous through valiant deeds of "iron men in wooden ships"! The burning of the *Philadelphia* in the harbor of Tripoli is an outstanding example of the performance of our Navy of those days, an exploit which for enterprise and daring has not been surpassed, even down to the present day. The Tripoli monument on the U. S. Naval Academy lawn at Annapolis bears silent but impressive tribute to the brave officers and men of the United States Navy who lost their lives in desperate hand to hand encounters with some of those pirates during the Tripolitan War.

Aside from the fact that in the early years of the nineteenth century Morocco had been compelled by the European powers to suppress piracy and the traffic in Christian slaves, that country had undergone a period of about a thousand years of practical isolation from the influence of western civilization, save, indeed, for the sparse European occupations which took place from time to time in certain restricted areas on her northern coast.

But one fine morning in 1830 the Sultan awoke to discover one of the foremost European powers energetically engaged in occupying the adjacent territory directly to the eastward of the land of His Shereefian Majesty, this having been precipitated as a result of the now famous blow inflicted by the Dey of Algeria upon the French consul to Algiers. The consequent bombardment of that city by the French fleet and the flight of the Dey marked the beginning of French influence in North Africa, which in time was destined to result in the tri-colored banner of that republic flying from flagstaffs across the whole of Northwest Africa, thus fulfilling the prophetic dreams and cherished hopes of her prolific author, Prévost-Paradol, and representing the achievement of her statesman and colonial builder, Jules Ferry.

The Sultan of Morocco was at first pleased with the French conquest of Algeria, as the Dey of that country, being a Turk, was his traditional enemy, but as the conquest progressed, and as the boundary line between Morocco and Algeria had never been definitely established, continual disputes arose over this boundary, and France soon found herself also engaged in armed conflict with the wild Moroccan tribes who dwelt along that border and who made desultory raids into Algerian territory.

Although Algeria was declared French territory in 1848, France was absorbed in the pacification of that country until the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, 1870, which date still found France and Morocco engaged in disputes incident to the hostile attitude persisted in by the tribes who dwelt along the above mentioned boundary line. Furthermore, having been born and bred in an atmosphere charged with tyranny and intrigue, it was not the way of Sultans to be at peace with anybody for long, not even among their own families and tribes; and thus it was that the Hassanian Dynasty—the branch to which belonged the Sultan of that day and which extends down to the present incumbent—found itself perpetuating the cycle of turmoil, torpid administration and internecine strife which had been characteristic of its predecessors for ages back.

However, the inglorious record of the Hassanian Dynasty was in a measure redeemed through the appearance upon the scene in 1873 of an able Sultan, Moulay-el-Hassan, the father of the present one, Moulay Youssef, who proved to be both a capable leader and an energetic administrator. He asserted his authority throughout the empire and suppressed many rebellious tribes, as indicating the conciliatory attitude adopted toward European countries and the trend of his mind along modern lines. A resident representative of the German Government was received in the court at Fez in 1873, and in 1877 France was requested to detail a permanent military mission to Morocco to assist in reorganizing and modernizing the armies of the country. It was during his reign that Morocco made her initial appearance upon the stage of modern international affairs, as notably evidenced by the calling of the Madrid Convention in 1880, over affairs in Morocco. As previously pointed out the United States was a party to this convention, the other powers represented being Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Sweden and Norway, and Morocco.

Previous to calling of the Madrid Convention practically the only powers actively contending for spheres of influence in Morocco were France and England, and, up to that time, those two countries, accordingly, were the only ones enjoying the privileges of "most favored nation treatment" in their commercial intercourse with the Sultan. But this was changed as a result of this

convention and as outlined in the following article quoted therefrom: "The right to the treatment of the most favored nation is recognized by Morocco as belonging to all the powers represented at the Madrid conference." In addition to equalizing the terms for conducting international trade with Morocco this convention also established a fixed and uniform basis for exercising the right of protection for certain personnel employed by the accredited diplomatic agents of the various powers, as well as the right for foreigners to hold property in Morocco. This convention, which had far reaching effect with reference to Moroccan affairs in general, was concluded at Madrid on July 3, 1880, favorably acted upon by the United States Senate on May 5, 1881, ratified by President Arthur on May 10 and proclaimed December 21 of the same year.

The next ten years of Moroccan history following the Madrid Convention were outwardly—this word is used advisedly—uneventful from an international point of view, although with the increase of commercial privileges came a corresponding increase in political activity among the rival European powers. In the meantime, however, France found it necessary to occupy Tunisia in order to "protect the eastern border of Algeria." The old saying that after France had effected successful conquest of Algeria one eye of the republic was fixed upon Tunisia and the other upon Morocco seems to have been amply proven by subsequent events. It is of incidental interest here to observe that the French seizure of Tunisia, in 1881, followed by her establishing a protectorate over that country, proved distasteful to Italy and may be said in a large measure to have caused her to join hands with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance of 1883.

The Sultan sent an embassy to Berlin in 1889, and during the following year Germany negotiated a five-year commercial treaty with the Moorish Government. A British mission was dispatched to Fez in 1891 for the purpose of negotiating a commercial treaty, but, after much backing-and-filling on the part of the Sultan, this mission failed of achieving its aim. Fez was fast becoming a center of conflicting "spheres of influence." As in previous years, French and British interest in Moroccan affairs predominated during this decade, the envoys of those countries being the most active in their contact with the court at Fez; this interest was,

moreover, due in part to the keen rivalries existing between those countries over their respective spheres of influence in Egypt, and also to the fact that preponderance in Mediterranean seapower was confined to those two powers, a fact which should not be overlooked in a study of this subject. At that time French seapower alone was equal to, if, indeed, it did not exceed, the combined naval strengths of the powers constituting the Triple Alliance.

But the main contributory factors to British and French interest in Morocco proper may be broadly classed as commercial and strategic; and a brief analysis of those factors is of pertinent interest at this point.

As viewed from the British angle her commercial interests in Morocco were of considerable importance and justified such action as would insure an open door for her own trade, as well as for her merchants to pursue unhampered reciprocal trade relations with the Moorish Government. The broader aspect of the case, however, lay in the strategic. In fact, consistent with conditions which obtained in the Mediterranean at that time, her national interest demanded a policy which would preserve either an independent Morocco or a neutral zone along the northern coast adjacent to the Atlantic and bordering upon the Mediterranean opposite and in close proximity to Gibraltar. She could not afford to jeopardize her right to free and unobstructed access to the Mediterranean, via the Straits of Gibraltar, by allowing a strong military power to obtain entire control of Morocco. In short, British trade routes through Suez to India and the Far East, and her other interests in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, constituted the keystone of the arch of her concern in Moroccan affairs, and she is governed by the identical policy even to this day.

Now, turning to the French policy respecting Morocco, it is obvious that, France having definitely established herself on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, in Algeria and Tunisia, her commercial interests in that sea assumed considerable proportions. Moreover, since England had securely established herself at Gibraltar, and thus controlled one side of the straits, it was manifestly of special importance to successful commercial exploitation of her North African colonies that France should be assured of free access to the Atlantic, either by an independent Morocco or

by French domination in that country. Furthermore, the strategic element with respect to her security in Algeria demanded special attention, as a study of the topography along the Algerian-Moroccan boundary will clearly indicate—a conflict in that quarter would resolve itself into a "down-hill" fight for the Moroccans and an "up-hill" fight for the Algerians. In other words, the rugged nature of the country in that vicinity is such as to make it imperative that France should insist either upon domination in Moroccan affairs or else insure that a spirit of friendliness for her would obtain in that country, if the Algerian frontier was to be made secure against disastrous attack from the Moroccan side. The whole plan of French colonization in North Africa, indeed, her whole endeavor on that continent, today revolves around the above outlined policy as a fixed center, and, as will later be shown, the formation of the Entente Cordiale, with England, and the allied victory in the World War have materially contributed further to crystallize this policy for her; in fact, it may be said that this policy now constitutes one of her major national commitments.

The closing years of the nineteenth century found both Germany and Spain manifesting increased interest in Moroccan affairs. Also, coincident with this German interest—indeed, one of its contributory factors—there was being generated in Germany an ardent desire to become one of the world's great sea powers, as presaged by the laws passed in 1897-98 laying the foundation for that powerful fleet which was destined to come to such an inglorious end at Scapa Flow.

As for Spain, although her interests in Morocco at this time were comparatively meager, being confined almost entirely to her possessions around the Melilla-Ceuta district on the Mediterranean and that of the Rio de Oro on the Atlantic side, she nevertheless was to become a pivotal point in a cycle of events which, in a few years, was to end the eleven centuries of absolute Moorish sovereignty in Morocco. The death of the Sultan, Moulay-el-Hassan, also occurred during this decade, in 1894, and his favorite son, Abdul Aziz, then only sixteen years of age, was proclaimed Sultan at Rabat, the burial place of his father.

The dawn of the twentieth century witnessed the Franco-Moorish tension rapidly approaching the breaking point owing to the increasingly recurrent raids carried into Algerian territory by

the rebellious Moroccan tribes who dwelt along that frontier. In order to discourage and counteract those raids France, in 1901, found it both necessary and expedient to put forth her strong right arm and annex certain strategically located Moorish oases in the immediate region of the Algerian border; although the territory thus annexed was relatively small, it registered the first phase of French "peaceful penetration" into Morocco. No formal opposition was voiced by European powers. Italy had already been appeased for the French occupation of Tunisia and the establishing of a French naval base at Bizerta, by the Franco-Italian Agreement of 1900, in which Italy obtained France's sanction for the former to exercise an unrestricted hand in Tripoli. England was absorbed in the Boer War which was then in progress, and the dual alliance between France and Russia acted as a restraining influence upon Germany.

In 1902 France took the next step in extending her sphere of influence in Morocco by attempting to negotiate a secret treaty with Spain having for its purpose the parceling out of Moroccan territory between those two powers. England, having been apprised of this, interposed her objections, and the outcome of it all was that a crisis was brought about in the Spanish Cabinet and the treaty failed of ratification by that country.

Meanwhile, conditions in Morocco were fast going from bad to worse. History was again repeating itself in that the vicious strife then prevalent among the various tribes and factions was disrupting the administrative stability of the country. Sultan Abdul Aziz had inherited but little, if any, of the administrative and executive ability of his father, Moulay-el-Hassan, and, as a crowning event to this chaos, Abdul Aziz became entangled in the fly-paper of European loan markets in the latter part of 1902. Indeed, this turned out to be for Morocco a veritable "financial tanglefoot age," which was not only to prove responsible in a large degree for the eventual downfall of Abdul Aziz, but was destined to cut into the very heart of the sovereignty of his country. Although Abdul Aziz made desperate efforts to levy and collect his taxes in order to retrieve himself from this difficult situation, it was not unlike trying to lift himself by his bootstraps from this quagmire of financial depression, and ere long the European powers, principally France, began to foreclose upon the Sultan by virtually taking over

control of Moroccan customs as collateral for the loans advanced to him. Thus the condition of Morocco was on the verge of a crisis.

We now approach the crux of this article. It is the year 1904. At that time the "Big Five" European powers were, in accordance with the "balance of power" doctrine, divided into two distinct political groups—the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance; but, owing to the phenomenal development during the last decade of Germany, not alone as a staunch commercial rival but as a formidable military power as well, both on land and sea, that political equilibrium was being seriously deranged. Accordingly, England had come to realize that isolation from European affairs was no longer to her best interests. Indeed, as far back as 1899 she had indicated her willingness to assist in bringing about an Anglo-German alliance. But that was not to be, so she later chose to enter an alliance with one of the parties to the Dual Alliance, France. One of the chief issues upon which was based this Franco-British rapprochement grew out of the conjoint attitudes assumed by those two powers over Moroccan affairs. As has previously been pointed out, both France and England were vitally interested in Morocco. Also, for many years, those two powers had held conflicting interests in other parts of the world, notably in Egypt, Siam and Madagascar. The Moroccan question became the common ground upon which they met to compose their differences and to effect an alliance.

The negotiations leading up to this agreement were concluded in April, 1904, when M. Delcassé and Lord Lansdowne, the respective French and British Foreign Ministers, affixed their signatures to the document. Thus was born the now famous Entente Cordiale. The following extracts, which are pertinent to the subject of this article, are quoted from certain declarations contained in the above historic agreement:

> His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt. . . . The government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco. . . . His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part recognize that it appertains to France, more particularly as a power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may

require. They declare that they will not obstruct any action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901. . . . The two governments, being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those two countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges. The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall settle the ports of entry. This mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time. Nevertheless, the government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the state over these great undertakings of public interest. . . . In order to insure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of October 29, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance. . . . In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortification or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou. This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. . . . The two governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish Coast of the Mediterranean. . . . In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government. The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government. The two governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

The above declaration, however, contained some secret clauses which did not come into the public light until November, 1911, when the Paris press made a "scoop" which caused the political world to sit up and take notice, for reasons which will be apparent

when we take up the subject of the Algeciras Conference further along in this article. Those secret clauses dealt primarily with our old friend, Morocco. They presaged the eventual downfall of Abdul Aziz, and accordingly provided for the parceling out of Moroccan territory when the Sultan's downfall had become a fact, as is indicated from the following which is quoted from one of the secret clauses:

> The two governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta and other precincts should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain. Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles 4 and 7 of the Declaration of today's date, and undertake to carry them out. She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territorities placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

As was forecast in the Franco-British Declaration outlined above, the next stage in the proceedings of Moroccan affairs was reached when the Franco-Spanish Declaration was negotiated on October 3, 1904. The salient points to this public declaration were that Spain declared her adherence to the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8 of the same year, and that both France and Spain "remained firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan."

But, as in the case of the Anglo-French Declaration, secret clauses also formed a part of the Franco-Spanish agreement; and, similarly, those secret clauses were not made public until November, 1911, when the Paris press made the aforementioned sensational scoop. A paraphrased summary of the secret clauses reveals that, owing to Spain's possessions along the Moroccan coast, she was accorded similar rights in the Moorish country as passed to France under the Franco-British agreement. It was further stipulated that Spain would not undertake to assert her right of action for fifteen years without French sanction, that under no circumstances should any foreign power be requested to render assistance during any changing phase of the political status of Morocco, and that all economic projects looking to the development of railways, public works, etc., should come under the immediate cognizance and direction of French and Spanish interests.

Subsequently, another Franco-Spanish secret treaty pertaining to Morocco was negotiated on September 1, 1905.

Thus, owing to her interests along the Moorish Coast, the subject of Moroccan affairs was formally projected into the purview of Spain, and those interests acted as a lubricant to the ways from which was launched the Entente Cordiale upon the sea of European politics. Furthermore, although Morocco constituted one of the major cogs in the machine which fabricated that Franco-British rapprochement and by which those two powers reached an agreement over their serious differences which existed on other parts of the globe, that machine, indirectly at least, also brought to an end the autonomous status of the Shereefian Empire and advanced France one step nearer the goal of her colonial policy—the establishing of a French protectorate over Morocco.

To summarize the situation at this critical period of Moroccan history it will be seen that the panacea to existing evils in Morocco, as prescribed by French diplomatic practitioners, was French "peaceful penetration" into that country. England was called in for consultation over the condition of the patient and subscribed to the French diagnosis. Spain was permitted to feel the patient's pulse. The direct reaction of this consultation was the Franco-British agreement of 1904. Germany, not being a Mediterranean power, was not called into the above consultation, although she possessed extensive commercial interests in the Moorish country. However, as will later be shown, Germany indicated in no uncertain manner her displeasure at not being invited to take part.

In the meantime the Russo-Japanese War was in progress, and, although at first blush it apparently is a long-distance echo from Mukden to the caravan paths of Morocco, that war nevertheless played no inconsiderable part in bringing to the fore certain changing phases of political line-ups among the European powers, which were to have a very direct bearing upon Moroccan affairs. In order properly to stress this point let us briefly consider the comparative military strengths and the relative spheres of influence wielded on the European Continent by the various powers both prior to and subsequent to the war between Russian and Japan. It may be said that the period extending from the middle of the nineteenth century up to 1870 was one of French preponderance, the twenty years immediately following the Franco-Prussian War was one of German ascendency, while that from

1890 up to the Russo-Japanese War constituted a period of Russian preponderance. During the latter period, moreover, this predominating influence of Russia served as a potent deterrent to any aims of German aggression on that continent, and this period was one of comparative peace and quiet throughout Europe. The Muscovite Bear had long been the peace-bearing counterweight in the European political balance.

But, with the defeat of the Czar's army and navy by the little brown men of the East, Russia immediately became enveloped in an orgy of anarchy which, for a time at least, caused her to fade out of the picture as a dominating political influence in the Old World. One of the outstanding consequences of the defeat of the Russians by the Japanese was, insofar as concerned European affairs, the undeniable supremacy which passed to Germany and which rendered her incomparably the foremost military power on that continent.

Therefore, Japan having taken the measure of Russia as a military power early in that war, the ink was hardly dry on the final touches of the French, British and Spanish Agreements over Morocco before Germany indicated her displeasure at being left out of the Moroccan negotiations; this was manifested by Emperor William II tossing his spiked helmet into the European political ring during his now famous visit to Tangier on March 31, 1905. That visit occurred close upon the tenth anniversary of the opening of the Kiel Canal, and German sea power had become an established fact. Incidentally, it should here be stated that one of the units of the German Navy, the cruiser *Friederich Carl,* acted as escort to the Kaiser, who was on board the liner *Hamburg,* when he made his Tangier trip. Upon going ashore in that city the Kaiser was enthusiastically greeted by the German residents, and he received the diplomatic corps and also held an audience with a Moorish delegation which had come to greet him from the Sultan's court at Fez. The Emperor let it be known that Germany intended to protect the interests of her nationals in Morocco, and emphasized the fact that his country recognized the absolute sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of the Moorish Empire, and, that it was his desire to bring about an understanding with the Sultan to that end. It would thus appear that, although the contents of the secret clauses of the French, British and Spanish

Agreements of 1904 were not made public until November, 1911, the efficient German intelligence system had become aware of the contents soon after the negotiations had been completed.

It has been asserted in some circles that it was the Kaiser's desire to disrupt the Franco-British rapprochement through his visit to Tangier; but, be that as it may, that short visit was sufficient to set all of Europe talking for a full year, and also served to stiffen the Sultan's opposition to some reform measures which the French had a short time previously proposed be put into effect to preserve order in Morocco. Furthermore, by that visit Germany served notice to the world of her intention henceforth to take a more aggressive part in international affairs, particularly European.

As viewed from a naval standpoint, another outstanding manifestation of the effect of the Franco-British Agreement, the Entente Cordiale, upon European affairs in general was the change which ultimately took place in assigning certain naval units of those two powers to new theaters of operation. Ante-dating the Napoleonic Wars it had been the British policy to assign the most formidable units comprising her sea power to the Mediterranean, and it is now well known that one of the most potent factors in the maintenance of European peace during the Boer War was the efficiency and high standard of perfection attained by the British Mediterranean Fleet, at that time. In fact, for years the British Mediterranean Fleet had been the pride of her navy and was much more powerful than the units assigned to the North Sea and the Channel. As for France, owing to her geographical position, she had been compelled to divide her naval forces between the Channel and the Mediterranean; but, as already pointed out, German sea power had become an established fact, and England was not slow in realizing that for her part the North Sea or the North Atlantic would be the next probable scene of major fleet combat operations. Therefore, after the Franco-British rapprochement, England moved her most powerful ships from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, while France on the other hand was thus free to concentrate her major naval forces in the Mediterranean. Obviously, the World War proved the soundness of the logic upon which that arrangement was based.

Following closely upon the Kaiser's Tangier visit, the Sultan of Morocco, Abdul Aziz, who as has already been shown was in des-

perate straits with regard to the administration of his country, approached the signatory powers of the Madrid Convention of 1881, with the view of calling another international conference over Moroccan affairs. Germany encouraged the Sultan's action on this point, but both France and England objected to calling another conference and indicated that with their concluding the agreement of 1904 those two powers had definitely considered the Moroccan question as a closed incident, and that to reopen it would only compromise the intent of the Entente Cordiale. Both Germany and the Sultan persisted, however, in their contention that the calling of another conference was highly desirable in settling amicably the status of Morocco. At this juncture the relations between France and Germany over this question became quite tense, as also, but to a lesser degree, those between England and Germany; and it is not too much to say that seeds of war were then being sown in the hot beds of intrigue which surrounded the court at Fez, and that those seeds were destined later to germinate and develop under Morocco's tropical sun, and to be borne by the balmy breezes across the Mediterranean to propagate on the European continent.

However, through an agreement reached in September, 1905, arrangements were finally made for calling another international conference, to which France and Germany agreed to submit the matters in dispute between them relative to Morocco. This conference, known as the Algeciras Conference, convened on January 16, 1906, at Algeciras, Spain, and was composed of the signatory powers to the Madrid Convention, also Russia. This conference is of especial interest from the American standpoint, inasmuch as it was the second time that the United States had officially participated in international negotiations over Moroccan affairs.

The outstanding subjects contained in the Act of Algeciras and as evolved by that conference may be summarized as follows: The organization and control of the Moroccan police; exclusion of contraband arms; creation of a state bank to facilitate financial reforms; devising improved methods of collecting revenues; creation of new sources of revenue, and assuring the application of the principle of economic liberty relative to public services and public works in the country. Owing to its international aspect in a military sense the understanding arrived at relative to the distribution of police force at the eight seaports is of special interest. This

article of the act specified: That the ports of Mogador, Safi, Mazaghan and Rabat were to be policed by France; the ports of Tetuan and Larache by Spain; while France and Spain were jointly assigned the task of policing Casablanca and Tangier; the police force to consist of not more than 2,500 natives, with Moorish kaids as commanders, French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers as instructors, while a Swiss army officer was to serve as inspector general, all of which arrangement was to be effective for a period of five years.

The above conference adjourned on April 7, 1906, the American plenipotentiaries having signed the act under reservations of the following declaration:

> The government of the United States of America, having no political interest in Morocco and no desire or purpose having animated it to take part in the conference other than to secure for all peoples the widest equality of trade and privilege with Morocco and to facilitate the institution of reforms in that country tending to insure complete cordiality of intercourse without and stability of administration within for the common good, declares that, in acquiescing in the regulations and declarations of the conference, in becoming a signatory to the General Act of Algeciras and to the Additional Protocol, subject to ratification according to constitutional procedure, and in accepting the application of those regulations and declarations to American citizens and interests in Morocco, it does so without assuming obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof.

In giving its advice and consent, on December 12, 1906, to the ratification of the act the Senate of the United States resolved "as a part of this act of ratification, that the Senate understands that the participation of the United States in the Algeciras Conference, and in the formulation and adoption of the General Act and Protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the sole purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in Morocco, the protection as to life, liberty and property of its citizens residing or traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices and efforts in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menace the peace between powers signatory with the United States to the treaty of 1880, all of which are on terms of amity with this government; and without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by the United States in their scope." Under the foregoing reservations President Roosevelt ratified the Act of Algeciras on December 14, 1906.

It is here worthy of note that although France, England and Spain had previously arranged for the parceling out of Morocco in accordance with their secret treaties of 1904, Article 123 of the Act of Algeciras provided that: "All treaties, conventions, and arrangements of the Signatory Powers with Morocco remain in force. It is understood, however, that in case of conflict between their provisions and those of the present General Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail." And it is the fact that France, England and Spain entered this conference bound under pledges of their secret treaties over Morocco which caused such a sensation in Europe when those secret clauses were first made public in the Paris press in November, 1911. Even at this late postwar time—this era of League of Nations, International Court of Justice, covenants openly arrived at, etc.—one wonders, when referring to the old order of secret diplomacy, whether he can truthfully say: "Them days have gone forever!" At any rate, it is to be hoped so.

When viewed in retrospect at this late date the Moroccan situation affords conclusive evidence of the extensive colonial aspirations cherished by both France and Germany, especially in Africa, and whereas Morocco had constituted the common ground upon which France and England effected a compromise over their colonial differences, that country was also to be the ground upon which France and Germany were to pit their diplomatic wits in attaining their respective aims of colonial expansion on the Dark Continent. But even so, it was one of the paramount purposes of the Algeciras Conference to preserve the integrity of Morocco, as outlined in the opening paragraphs of the act resulting therefrom, which specified that:

> In the name of Almighty God . . . Inspired by the interest attaching itself to the reign of order, peace, and prosperity in Morocco, and recognizing that the attainment thereof can only be effected by means of the introduction of reforms based upon the principle of sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, of the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality, have resolved, upon the invitation of His Shereefian Majesty, to call together a conference at Algeciras for the purpose of arriving at an understanding upon said reforms, as well as examining the means for obtaining the resources necessary for their application. . . .

It would thus seem from the foregoing that the integrity of the Moorish Empire had been rendered secure against future com-

promise by any power coveting an increased sphere of influence therein. But, as we shall see, France cast a couple of anchors to windward in the form of certain articles in that act: The first was a foot-hold of a very potential value which she retained in Moroccan affairs, through insisting upon participating, with Spain, in providing French instructors for the police force in six out of the eight ports open to commerce. This privilege was very bitterly contested by Germany at the conference table, but France finally succeeded in carrying her point. The second was with regard to the traffic in arms in the region bordering upon Algeria, over which France insisted upon exercising exclusive concern in dealing with Morocco.

Although the Act of Algeciras was ratified on June 18, 1906, by Sultan Abdul Aziz it did not prove generally popular with his people, and many of the tribes accused the Sultan of having sold out his country to the powers. Obviously, this did not tend to add to his prestige among his people, which as already pointed out was at a very low ebb. In fact, in less than fourteen months after the Sultan's ratification of the act conditions in Morocco had become so chaotic that an event occurred at Casablanca, which for bloodshed and disaster, eclipsed any other event in the modern catastrophic history of that country.

The above mentioned event was the Moorish massacre at Casablanca of July 30, 1907, followed by the bombardment of that city, on August 5, by the French cruiser *Galilee*. The immediate cause of this trouble was the Moorish murder of nine Europeans, including three French subjects, who were engaged in certain work incident to some harbor improvements at Casablanca, the concession for which had been granted to a French construction company. But, broadly speaking, the basic causes of that trouble were three-fold: first, the general disorderly condition which obtained throughout Morocco as a result of the weak reign of Abdul Aziz; second, the aggressive prosecution by the French of their drives against the lawless tribes in the vicinity of the Algerian border and the recent French occupation of Moorish territory around Oudja, in eastern Morocco; and lastly, the resentment which had been growing among the Chaouia tribesmen around Casablanca over the appointment of French customs officials in that port.

When news of the murder of the three French subjects reached Tangier, the cruiser *Galilee,* which was then off that port, was dispatched to Casablanca, and early on the morning of August 5 the cruiser sent a small landing party ashore for guard duty at the French Consulate in the latter port. After disembarking this party encountered some resistance by the natives when entering the gates of the city. Previous arrangements having been made before embarking the landing party to the effect that in event of attack by the natives a signal would be sent up from the French Consulate for the *Galilee* to open fire upon the city, that signal was accordingly made, and soon thereafter the cruiser opened fire and bombarded the city for about three hours, at the end of which time Casablanca was but a shambles with hundreds of killed and wounded natives. A short time before noon another French cruiser, the *Du Chyala,* arrived from Tangier and also sent a landing party ashore. Later in the day the Spanish cruiser *Alvarado de Bazan* anchored off the port and sent a small guard to the Spanish Consulate. On August 7, other units of the French Fleet arrived and landed several detachments of the French Army. They took up their positions on the outskirts of the city, where they were covered by the guns from the French Fleet, and began active operations against the Chaouia tribesmen.

Thus the occupation of Oudja, in eastern Morocco, and the bombardment of Casablanca by the French Fleet and the subsequent occupation of that region by the French Army may be said to mark the first phase of Morocco's passing under a French protectorate.

During the next few weeks the French gradually extended their occupation until it encompassed practically the whole of the Chaouia region. The remainder of the year was filled with serious uprisings throughout Morocco against Abdul Aziz and, on January 4, 1908, his half-brother, Moulay-Hafid, was proclaimed Sultan at Fez by some of the reactionary factions. In the meantime Abdul Aziz had gone to Rabat where he could seek protection of the French should it become necessary. In the following August the forces under Moulay-Hafid came in contact with those under Abdul Aziz, and the latter suffered decisive defeat at the hands of his brother.

In addition to inheriting the serious and burdensome financial

entanglements of his brother's reign, Sultan Moulay-Hafid was also immediately confronted with another succession of demands upon the already depleted Moorish treasury, chief among which was a large indemnity claimed by France incident to the massacre and the bombardment of Casablanca. This involved floating a new series of European loans, with the consequent additional liens upon the country's customs receipts, all of which still further tightened the strangle-hold upon the sovereignty of Morocco and hastened the days of a French protectorate.

Germany having viewed with some concern the above mentioned French military occupation of Morocco, as well as the obvious state of dependence being progressively imposed upon the Sultan as a result of his financial difficulties, she sought to amplify, with France, the interpretation of the terms of the Act of Algeciras. This culminated on February 8, 1909, in a joint declaration by those two powers, the terms of which specified that:

> The government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government, being equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Algeciras Act, have agreed to define the meaning which they attach to the articles of that act with a view to avoid in the future all sources of misunderstanding between them. Therefore, the government of the French Republic, firmly attached to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire, being resolved to safeguard the principle of economic equality, and, consequently, not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests in the country; and the Imperial German Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognizing on the other hand that the special political interests of France in that country are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace, and being resolved not to impede those interests: Declare that they do not pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favor or in that of any power an economic privilege, and that they will endeavor to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession.

Although the above Franco-German Declaration was designed primarily to renew the pledge for preserving the integrity of Morocco and for removing any causes of friction between those two powers over that country, stormy times in connection therewith lay ahead, and Moulay-Hafid's days as Sultan of the Moorish Empire were to prove comparatively few and full of trouble.

Throughout 1910 Morocco was a seething mass of unrest and fanaticism, which increased as time went on and developed into a spirit of open revolt against the Sultan for the tyrannical methods

adopted by him in exacting additional taxes and tribute from his people for the support of his rapidly disintegrating armies. Conditions in the vicinity of Fez became especially alarming for the European inhabitants, as in addition to the revolt against the Sultan there was also being engendered among the natives a strong anti-European sentiment. This chaotic condition reached its climax in April, 1911, when the Sultan was besieged at Fez by the insurrectionary forces, whereupon Moulay-Hafid requested assistance from the French troops of occupation. The French Army readily accepted the invitation and occupied Fez, thus consummating the second phase of their program of establishing a protectorate over Morocco. Although England concurred in the French occupation of Fez, both Spain and Germany looked upon this latest move of France with some misgivings. Spain shortly afterwards poured more of her troops into the stormy Riff region and also occupied the cities of Larash and El-Kasr in northwest Morocco, thus signifying her intention of asserting her claim for the previously designated "Spanish zone," in the event that the French occupation should be accompanied by any changing status of Morocco. At this time Morocco fairly bristled with French and Spanish bayonets. Germany also evidently began to sense the feeling that her sphere of influence in Morocco was slipping, as was also her aspiration for colonial expansion on the Dark Continent, so she took steps to apply the brakes by calling upon her navy to stage another international demonstration, as manifested by her dispatching the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir, on the south Atlantic coast of Morocco, in July of that year. Although this move, as formally interpreted by Germany to the powers, was intended primarily to protect the lives and interests of her nationals residing in that locality who had become alarmed at the ferment which had spread to the natives in the surrounding region, it nevertheless fell like a veritable bombshell in the European political camps and came very near precipitating the war which was destined to come just three years later. The writer was in England during the month of July, 1911, when the feeling incident to the *Panther's* Agadir visit was at its height, and he remembers well the impressions which he gained from the European press at that time and which caused him

to feel little surprise when the World War broke forth in 1914.

In the heated discussion evoked at that time by the Franco-German controversy over Morocco, which grew directly out of the *Panther's* Agadir trip, England supported France and thus demonstrated to the world that the Entente Cordiale possessed a fine set of sharp teeth and that it was something more than a mere diplomatic arrangement; whereupon Germany decided that the time was not yet ripe for springing the trigger which would release an European War, so she backed down, but not without first scoring a point in favor of her quest for colonial expansion in Africa; this resulted from the Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911, which in effect stipulated that for Germany's recognizing the principle of a French protectorate in Morocco, France in turn ceded to Germany certain territory in the French Congo in exchange for a small parcel of German territory in the Upper Cameroons. Although that convention allayed, for a time at least, the European war, the irony of it all was that it also converted the Act of Algeciras into bits of blood-red confetti, which three years later were to be strewn upon the four winds of Europe from the mailed fist of Mars. Furthermore, with the signing of that convention it may be said that the absolute sovereignty of the Moorish Empire definitely went by the board, for in less than six months thereafter Sultan Moulay-Hafid signed, with France, the Convention of Fez in which he recognized a French protectorate over Morocco, thus marking the beginning of the third phase of France's program in that country.

The Convention of Fez provided for the appointment of a French resident-general in Morocco with authority to act as the Sultan's sole representative in dealing with other powers. Within a few days after that convention was signed another series of serious insurrections occurred at Fez, in which many Europeans were killed, including several French officers who were massacred by some of their own Moroccan troops. Then it was that France seized hold of that country in earnest and with an iron hand. General (now Marshal) Lyautey having been appointed French resident general in Morocco, he proceeded to Fez and assumed the duties of that office, and instituted a vigorous campaign of pacifying the country and restoring order. Through his timely, intelligent, and decisive action in dealing with the hordes of

fanatical insurrectionists in and around Fez General Lyautey narrowly averted a Holy War. Subsequent uprisings of a minor nature occurred during that summer, and as Moulay-Hafid was accused of duplicity and of being implicated in the uprisings he abdicated, in August, 1912, in favor of another brother, Moulay Youssef, the present Sultan.

Throughout 1913 and up to the outbreak of the World War the French army of occupation, under the intelligent and sympathetic direction of General Lyautey, was engaged in taking the strategic strongholds of the country and extending their lines of communications. After the outbreak of hostilities on the European Continent in 1914 the French experienced considerable trouble with German intrigues which were carried on through the Spanish zones, but General Lyautey managed to keep the country occupied and sent thousands of men and tons of supplies to France to aid in her prosecution of the War. The entire subject of the handling of the Moroccan situation during the trying periods of that war is a very interesting chapter in the history of that country and reflects great credit upon the genius of the resident general. Among the reform measures instituted by the French in Morocco are: extension of public works, highways and railroads; fostering of agricultural and industrial enterprises; inaugurating modern sanitary methods in improving the public health; extension of social institutions and educational facilities. In brief, the effect of French endeavor in Morocco has been one of decided evolution, not revolution, and when the numerous improvements, reforms, and other constructive measures instituted under the French protectorate are considered, one cannot help but feel that not merely Morocco, but the world as well, is better off for the French occupation of that country.

Any dissertation on Morocco, especially from a diplomatic angle, would be incomplete if no reference were made to the Moorish bandit *de luxe,* Raisuli, who twenty years ago, in 1904, kidnapped Perdicaris, an American citizen residing near Tangier, and held him for a $70,000 ransom. The United States sent an imposing naval force to Tangier and demanded the release of Perdicaris. Shortly thereafter the Sultan of Morocco advanced the ransom and Perdicaris was released. The American naval force assembled at Tangier on that occasion was one of the most, if not the most,

formidable ones which our government had ever dispatched to European waters on a mission designed primarily to support diplomatic negotiations during times of stress, and consisted of the *Brooklyn* (flagship), *Olympia, Baltimore, Cleveland, Atlanta, Castine* and *Marietta,* while assembled at Lisbon, within a day's run of Tangier, were the battleships *Iowa, Kearsarge, Maine* and *Alabama.* Perdicaris was released, we paid no ransom, and not a shot was fired. Although of small final proportions as an international event, that incident none the less affords a striking example of the potency of our Navy as a dynamic apostle of peace—and that is not the only instance on record where the fragrance and significance of diplomatic bouquets have been preserved and accentuated by saying it with battleships!

As for the Tangier of today, including the adjacent 140 square miles of hinterland comprising the internationalized zone, conditions therein have been but little improved in an economic sense during the past twenty years. Both France and Spain desire complete control of the Tangier zone and no agreement has yet been reached. Moreover, the unsatisfactory conditions which today obtain in that city offer a striking contrast to other sections of the country which have been subjected to the unhampered and helpful influences of the French protectorate. Although the Diplomatic Body, which really constitutes the civil government of the city, has endeavored in a fashion to improve conditions, its efforts have lacked the teamwork and coordination which are essential to progress, owing mainly to the international rivalries and jealousies which for years have existed among certain powers over the status of Tangier. At present those rivalries are confined for the most part to France, Spain and Great Britain. A convention bearing upon the subject of the future status of Tangier was signed by representatives of those three powers in December, 1923, at Paris, and has recently been ratified by those governments; but in view of the past history of negotiations over that unfortunate city it is difficult to view the future with much optimism, unless those international rivalries and jealousies are repressed, and opportunity afforded for the normal development of the city through the non-political and intelligent economic exploitation of her natural resources and inherent advantages, of which there are many. All in all, owing to its international scope, the subject of the future

status and development of Tangier is an interesting one, and diplomatic eyes will continue to focus upon the little white city situated on the Straits of Gibraltar. Our Consul General at Tangier is the American member of the Diplomatic Body of that city.

Another interesting phase of the Moroccan situation arises when comparison is made of the results achieved by the French and the Spanish in administration of their respective zones. Even as these lines are being written a very serious condition has developed in the Spanish zones of Morocco—which, in reality, is but an acute state in the incessantly hostile relations which for ages have existed between the Spaniards and the Moors. Should Spain ever relinquish hold upon the Riff region, the coastal section of which constitutes a strategic keystone to the control of the western Mediterranean, the future status of this question is pregnant with considerable international interest. It has even been predicted in some quarters that some day an exchange of the two Pillars of Hercules will take place between Spain and Great Britain, and one wonders what effect such an exchange would bring about in the relations of the various European powers. But as to that, we shall see what we shall see. At any rate it is safe to say that this region will continue for some time to come to be a source of much interest to students of international affairs.

During the past ten years international writers have advanced various theories as to the cause of the World War, some of which include: the vicious racial hatreds and rivalries which for ages have existed on the European Continent; the bitter Franco-German animosities over Alsace and Lorraine; Germany's open challenge to British supremacy in sea power; the Austrian charge that Russia was attempting to absorb the entire Balkan peninsula, including Constantinople, and that Serbia was being used only as a means to that end; and the frenzied and determined efforts which Germany was putting forth to achieve supremacy in the world's commerce, and, ultimately, world domination. Granted that those factors are intimately interwoven in the genetic fabric of that war, it is the writer's belief that when all of the causes shall have been placed in their relative order of importance on the pages of history, Morocco will stand well to the fore.

The foregoing outline serves to indicate the importance of that country in world affairs, resulting chiefly from her strategic loca-

tion; and, as viewed from that standpoint alone—not to mention the potentially great economic and commercial phases of the subject—her importance will increase rather than diminish, inasmuch as the long-range gun, the military triumph of the air, and other components of modern warfare have relegated the impregnable status of Gibraltar to a past age. Thus any first rate naval power possessing a dominating sphere of influence in Morocco is in a position to play a prominent part in maintaining the peace of the world. In truth, it may be asserted as a maxim that Morocco constitutes one of the hubs from which radiate many of the policies incorporated in Mediterranean sea power, and it is no exaggeration to say that much which affects the future peace of the world is "bound in Morocco!"